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This article is based on my keynote address at the 2012 CJAR Special Issue Symposium at CEIBS in Shang-
hai. The topic of the conference was “large shareholders” and I was honored to be given the opportunity tournal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of
ier B.V. All rights reserved.
pe@rotman.utoronto.ca
 Elsevier
Journal of Accounting Research and forms the basis for my CJAR Special Issue Symposium
seful comments from Heather Li and acknowledge the ﬁnancial support of the Deloitte
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say that there are several well-cited survey studies on corporate governance in accounting, economics, ﬁnance,
and management. Thus, in this paper I will not attempt a complete survey on the literature on large sharehold-
ers. Instead, I have decided to focus on one particular aspect – the heterogeneity of large shareholders.
We tell our PhD students that they should base their research on theory to the extent possible. At least in
ﬁnancial accounting the “theory” that is referred to is often analytical economics-based research. At the Rot-
man School we have the same emphasis on theory and I am personally a strong believer in anchoring your
work in theory. However, most analytical models are vague (to put it mildly) when describing exactly who
the large shareholders are and how they act. As this article will highlight, there is in fact rather considerable
diversity in the types of large shareholders we observe, and it is very likely that these may have diﬀerent eﬀects
on outcomes of interest to accounting researchers. Hence the reader can consider this article also as a call for
“attention to the context” in which the study is conducted. For example, I would encourage “case-based” type
studies that delve deeper into one particular form of large shareholder, such as state-owned enterprises in
China.
I would like to oﬀer three brief caveats. First, as already mentioned there are other, more comprehensive
surveys on corporate governance issues and I would recommend that readers consult these if relevant. Second,
although I consider several diﬀerent types of large shareholders I could clearly have included additional types
(e.g., the eﬀect of foreign shareholders). Finally, there are important measurement issues in deﬁning large
shareholders (using cut-oﬀs; multiple large owners; concentration ratios; ownership percentage versus voting
rights; considering potential nonlinearities; organizational form; etc.).
Section 2 provides a brief review of the classic Jensen and Meckling (1976) arguments and discusses both
vertical and horizontal agency costs. It also discusses the role of the second-largest shareholders and examines
how large shareholders exercise their monitoring in practice. Section 3 focuses on who the large shareholders
are. The chapter considers the roles of families, institutions, governments, and employee ownership. Large
shareholders are particularly prominent in private (i.e., unlisted) ﬁrms, and Section 4 summarizes relevant
research on these economically very important ﬁrms. Section 5 contains a discussion of variations across
selected countries in the types of dominating ownership, and Section 6 concludes.2. Overview of large shareholders and agency costs
2.1. Brief review of Jensen and Meckling (1976)
As this conference is motivated to a large extent by Jensen and Meckling (1976), it is worthwhile to ﬁrst
brieﬂy revisit and review their seminal study.1 Jensen and Meckling deﬁne an agency relationship as a contract
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service
on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties are util-
ity maximizers there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the
principal. The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for
the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the value-reducing activities of the agent.2
If a wholly owned ﬁrm is managed by the owner, he will make decisions which maximize his utility. This
situation is of course unusual other than for the smallest private ﬁrms and by deﬁnition not observed in pub-
licly traded companies. In such cases, Jensen and Meckling argue that agency costs will be generated by the
divergence between his interest and those of the outside shareholders, as he will then bear only a fraction of the
costs of any non-pecuniary beneﬁts he takes out in maximizing his own utility. Put diﬀerently, as the owner–
manager’s fraction of the equity falls, his fractional claim on the outcomes falls and this will tend to encourage
him to appropriate larger amounts of the corporate resources in the form of perquisites. This also makes it
1 Jensen and Meckling’s article was in part motivated by the observation by Adam Smith (1776) that “The directors of such [joint-stock]
companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot be well expected, that they should
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own . . .
Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the aﬀairs of such a company.”
2 In some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources to guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the
principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions (referred to as “bonding”).
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us in accounting, this is clearly one of the reasons for the demand for accounting-related information. In fact,
the genesis of accounting was in the “stewardship role” it can play in monitoring agents (see, e.g., Gjesdal,
1981 for a nice discussion). It is only more recently that the “valuation role” of accounting information
has gained in prominence (and may well be the dominating role today). Related to the stewardship role (or
governance) role of accounting, Jensen and Meckling argue that their theory can explain “why accounting
reports would be provided voluntarily to creditors and stockholders, and why independent auditors would
be engaged by management to testify to the accuracy and correctness of such reports.”
2.2. More on the role of ownership concentration (or importance of large shareholders)
There are two common approaches to corporate governance throughout most of the world (e.g., Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997). First, investors’ rights are protected to varying degrees across the world through the legal
process and legal environment. The second major approach, and the focus of this article, is ownership by large
investors.
Research provides evidence that managers, when left unmonitored, are more likely to manage earnings,
commit fraud, or make suboptimal investment decisions (e.g., Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Hope and Thomas,
2008). Thus, shareholder monitoring is an important mechanism by which agency costs can be reduced. How-
ever, while all shareholders have the responsibility to monitor managerial activities, the beneﬁts of doing so by
any individual shareholder are proportional to the percentage of shares owned (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Put another way, when ownership is widely dispersed, it is economically less fea-
sible for any individual shareholder to incur signiﬁcant monitoring costs, because she will receive only a small
portion of beneﬁts. Similarly, when ownership is dispersed, it is harder for shareholders to monitor managerial
actions.
Thus, as the percentage of ownership by individual shareholders increases (i.e., concentration increases),
the more willing individual shareholders are to incur necessary monitoring costs. That is, when ownership
is limited to one or a few individuals, it is easier and more eﬃcient for those individuals to directly monitor
managerial actions. This is the typical “vertical agency cost” argument (i.e., conﬂicts between managers and
owners) and leads to the general prediction that agency costs are expected to be lower as ownership concen-
tration increases.4
Potential manager–owner conﬂicts are not the only relevant issues. Horizontal agency costs relate to how
large shareholders can decrease a ﬁrm’s value through extracting private beneﬁt from the minority sharehold-
ers (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999). Morck et al. (1988) argue that increased ownership concentration may
entrench managers, as they are increasingly less subject to governance by boards of directors and to discipline
by the market for corporate control. Controlling shareholders may either engage in outright expropriation
from self-dealing transactions or exercise de facto expropriation through the pursuit of objectives that are
not proﬁt-maximizing in return for personal utilities. These controlling shareholders may attempt to hide these
activities from other stakeholders (e.g., minority shareholders and creditors) by manipulating reported perfor-
mance (an issue of obvious interest to accountants). In other words, a controlling owner can increase agency
costs via the positive association with private beneﬁts of control (e.g., Hope et al., 2012a).
To summarize the discussion, the presence of a controlling owner represents forces that work in opposite
directions. For a researcher, this is both a challenge and an opportunity. It is an opportunity if the researcher
is able to specify ex ante which set of agency costs is likely to be most signiﬁcant. For example, in countries
with less legal protection of the minority shareholders the main agency problem often exists between control-
ling shareholders and minority shareholders.3 Jensen and Meckling consider the term monitoring to include more than just measuring or observing the behavior of the agent. It
includes eﬀorts on the part of the principal to “control” the behavior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies,
operating rules, etc.
4 Furthermore, controlling shareholders could enable a long investment horizon which allows the building of strong relationships
between the ﬁrms and outside providers of capital (Ellul et al., 2009). In fact, a controlling shareholder could increase business focus and
make contracting negotiations easier.
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While the previous discussion explains the need for shareholders to monitor managers, the literature also
establishes the need for shareholders to monitor one another. For example, controlling shareholders have the
ability to exploit minority shareholders in closely-held corporations (e.g., Nagar et al., 2011). Such exploita-
tion can include higher compensation to controlling shareholders, misappropriation of assets, and dilution of
minority shareholders’ interests through the issuance of stock or dividends (Gogineni et al., 2010). As the own-
ership stake of a second shareholder increases, so does her ability and willingness to eﬀectively monitor the
largest shareholder. The monitoring activities by the second largest shareholder would be similar to those used
by the largest shareholder to monitor managers (Hope et al., 2012a).
Pagano and Roell (1998) specify conditions under which large shareholders monitor each other, reducing
expropriation and improving ﬁrm performance. They predict that expropriation of minority shareholders is
likely to be less severe when the ownership stake of non-controlling shareholders is more concentrated, as such
concentration makes it easier and more eﬀective to monitor the controlling shareholder. This is the typical
“horizontal agency cost” argument (i.e., conﬂicts between majority and minority shareholders) and leads to
the prediction that as ownership by the second largest shareholder increases, agency costs decrease.
2.4. How do large shareholders exercise their monitoring?
Often ﬁnance and accounting research is vague on the mechanisms through which monitoring happens. In
practice monitoring by a large shareholder could take many forms. Perhaps the most commonly discussed
means of monitoring discussed in the literature involves a large shareholder having a seat on the board. Sev-
eral studies show in a variety of contexts the board’s role in monitoring managers (e.g., Fama, 1980; Fama and
Jensen, 1983; Adams et al., 2010). Other forms of direct monitoring would be a large shareholder actively par-
ticipating in the ﬁrm’s operations or having routine meetings with managers. As the proportion of ownership
increases, the more beneﬁcial it is for large shareholders to engage in these types of costly direct monitoring
activities. Large shareholders can also serve to block business decisions that may be considered suboptimal
(e.g., aggressive expansion through negative net present value projects). Doing so involves an investment in
time and expertise by the shareholder to understand the consequences of major business decisions. Large
shareholders are also likely to have more control over the ﬁrm’s dividend (or capital distribution) policy,
as a way to further discipline managers’ actions.
3. Who are the large shareholders? Does it matter?
Analytical research on large shareholders tends to be rather generic and often does not consider that there
may be very diﬀerent types of large shareholders. There is surprisingly limited extant research on how diﬀerent
groups of large shareholders can aﬀect corporate outcomes (e.g., ﬁnancial reporting quality).5 Here I brieﬂy
consider research on the following owner types: families (including the CEO as owner), institutional investors,
governments, and employees.
3.1. Family ownership
A large fraction of businesses throughout the world are organized around families and there is a relatively
large literature on family ownership (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). Most of this research in on publicly listed
companies. For example, family-controlled ﬁrms dominate in East Asia and Latin America. As an indication
of the importance of family ﬁrms, La Porta et al. (1999) report that 65% of the 20 largest ﬁrms in Argentina
have at least a 20% family stake; in Hong Kong this fraction is 70%. In contrast, in Japan the corresponding
number is 5%.5 An exception is Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009). They examine eﬀects of diﬀerent types of institutional investors in the US and ﬁnd
that investor type has signiﬁcant eﬀects on several corporate policies. The only study I’m aware of in accounting is Dou et al. (2012) who
follow an approach similar to Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) and examine the eﬀects of large shareholders on accounting practices for
a large sample of US ﬁrms over the 2001–2009 period.
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(i.e., unlisted) ﬁrms oﬀer even more fertile ground for research. Section 4 discusses private ﬁrms in more detail.
A stream of research has examined “family ﬁrms” included in the S&P 500. This line of research is primarily
motivated by the fact that, notwithstanding the oft-cited idea that US publicly ﬁrms have widely dispersed
ownership, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) (and others) document that large shareholders are common and, in par-
ticular, note that founding families continue to hold equity stakes and board seats in nearly 33% of the For-
tune 500 ﬁrms. In other words, US ﬁrms may not be as diﬀerent from those observed elsewhere in the world as
thought by many. These founding families represent a unique class of long-term shareholders that hold poorly
diversiﬁed portfolios and often control senior management positions. Family owners can thus exert inﬂuence
and control over the ﬁrm, potentially leading to performance diﬀerences with nonfamily ﬁrms.
In a widely cited study, Anderson and Reeb (2003) investigate the relation between founding-family own-
ership and ﬁrm performance. They ﬁnd that, contrary to their conjecture, family ﬁrms perform better than
nonfamily ﬁrms. Additional analyses reveal that the relation between family holdings and ﬁrm performance
is nonlinear and that when family members serve as CEO, performance is better than with outside CEOs.
Overall, their results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that minority shareholders are adversely aﬀected
by family ownership, suggesting that family ownership may be an eﬀective organizational structure.
Ali et al. (2007) recognize that, compared with nonfamily ﬁrms, family ﬁrms face less severe agency prob-
lems due to the separation of ownership and management. However, they face more severe agency problems
that arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. These conﬂicting eﬀects are often referred to
as “entrenchment versus alignment.” Thus it is not clear what to predict regarding family ﬁrms’ disclosure
practices relative to other ﬁrms. Using a sample of only S&P 500 ﬁrms, Ali et al. (2007) conclude that family
ﬁrms report better quality earnings, are more likely to warn for a given magnitude of bad news, but make
fewer disclosures about their corporate governance practices. Consistent with family ﬁrms making better
ﬁnancial disclosures, the authors ﬁnd that family ﬁrms have larger analyst following, more informative ana-
lysts’ forecasts, and smaller bid–ask spreads.6
It is far from clear that the above ﬁndings should be generalized to other settings, even in the United States.
First, although the ﬁrms classiﬁed as “family ﬁrms” by deﬁnition meet the deﬁnition of a family ﬁrm for these
studies, others may employ a higher threshold for family ownership. Given the nonlinearities documented in
the US setting, it is thus highly unclear what to expect in very diﬀerent environments and with much higher
family ownership (e.g., in private ﬁrms). Even more importantly, conﬂicting evidence exists on whether having
family ownership increases or decreases a ﬁrm’s value, and it seems to be country dependent. Bertrand and
Schoar (2006) conclude that there is no strong empirical evidence for the economic superiority of family-con-
trolled businesses. According to Bertrand and Schoar (2006), family ﬁrms appear to underperform relative to
nonfamily ﬁrms in most countries: for example, Claessens et al. (2002) for several Southeast Asian countries;
Morck et al. (2000) for Canada; and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) for Sweden. Also, Bloom and Van Reenen
(2007) ﬁnd that family ﬁrms in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States are systemat-
ically associated with worse managerial practices. Bertrand and Schoar (2006) note two important exceptions.
Khanna and Palepu (2000) ﬁnd that business groups in India, which are for the most part family-controlled,
perform better than stand-alone ﬁrms in matched industries (see more on this below); and Sraer and Thesmar
(2007) who ﬁnd a premium for family ﬁrms in France.
3.1.1. The role of the CEO in family ﬁrms
There is comparatively limited research on the role of the CEO as part of the dominant family. A dominant
belief in the literature is that as CEO ownership increases, her incentives align more with those of other share-
holders, reducing the agency problem that arises from separation of ownership and control (e.g., Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). This is known as the alignment eﬀect which suggests reduced agency costs.6 In a closely related study, Chen et al. (2008) ﬁnd that, compared with nonfamily ﬁrms, family ﬁrms provide fewer earnings forecasts
and conference calls, but more earnings warnings. The authors interpret the former to be consistent with family owners having a longer
investment horizon, better monitoring of management, and lower information asymmetry between owners and managers, they interpret
the higher likelihood of earnings warnings to be consistent with family owners having greater litigation and reputation cost concerns. In
another related paper, Wang (2006) ﬁnds that founding family ownership is associated with higher earnings quality in S&P 500 ﬁrms (but
also shows that the relation is non-linear).
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interesting competing hypotheses when the CEO is related to the major shareholder. Because of the family
relationship, these shareholders no longer act as independent monitors in disciplining CEOs’ decisions. In
addition, family-controlled ﬁrms are likely to suﬀer from greater horizontal agency costs. It may be easier
for major shareholders, who are family members of the CEO, to extract private beneﬁts from minority share-
holders or other stakeholders. The reason it may be easier to extract these beneﬁts is that major family owners
typically have strong inﬂuence over choosing members of the board. Consequently, the monitoring eﬀective-
ness of the board may be impaired when its composition is determined primarily by the CEO’s family. These
arguments would support the idea that agency costs will increase when there is a family relation between the
CEO and major shareholder (Hope et al., 2012a).
An alternative view is that family member CEOs are less likely to act in ways that opportunistically harm
other family members. That is, installing a family member as the CEO could be a mechanism through which
family-owned companies can increase their monitoring of management and reduce the need for external mon-
itoring. If this eﬀect dominates, the agency costs are smaller when the CEO is a family member because famil-
ial ties are likely to create closer alignment of the CEO’s preferences with those of family owners.
In conclusion, vertical and horizontal agency costs supply opposite predictions for eﬀects of family ﬁrms. In
addition, there are strong diﬀerences in the degree to which families control business, to what extent the CEO
comes from the dominant family, and in other institutional arrangements. In short, there is ample “tension” in
terms of predictions and plenty of room for future research!3.1.2. Hope et al. (2012a) on agency conﬂicts in (private) family ﬁrms
Hope et al. (2012a) are interested in understanding how agency conﬂicts in private ﬁrms arise through own-
ership structures and family relationships. They analyze auditors’ increase of eﬀort and ﬁrms’ choice of audi-
tors in situations with higher level of agency conﬂicts. For a large sample of private Norwegian ﬁrms, they use
data obtained through special permission by the government to measure direct and ultimate ownership for
each shareholder as well as extended family relationships. Family relationships are measured based on mar-
riage and blood lines, going back four generations and extending out to fourth cousin, and cover all share-
holders, board members, and CEOs.
The authors ﬁnd that (excess) audit fees, their proxy for audit eﬀort in the face of agency conﬂicts, vary as
hypothesized with ﬁrm-level characteristics related to ownership structures and family relationships. Speciﬁ-
cally, they show that fees relate negatively to ownership concentration and to the extent of ownership by the
second-largest shareholder. Audit fees also relate negatively to the portion of shares held by the CEO, consis-
tent with ownership aligning the incentives of the CEO and other stakeholders. Audit fees are further posi-
tively associated with family relationships between the CEO and the major shareholder (a signal of reduced
monitoring and a situation in which expropriation by the family/major shareholder is easier).
With respect to board independence, they ﬁnd that audit fees decline as the number of board members
related to the largest shareholder increases, consistent with fewer agency conﬂicts between owners and the
board. In contrast, as the number of board members related to the CEO increases, fees increase, suggesting
less board independence and greater agency conﬂicts.
Hope et al. (2012a) report two interesting sets of results for the demand for Big 4 auditor. First, for agency
settings that are not CEO family-related, they observe results consistent with those obtained for the auditor
eﬀort tests. Speciﬁcally, the propensity to hire a Big 4 auditor increases as ownership concentration decreases,
ownership of the second largest owner decreases, and the major shareholder’s family inﬂuence on the board
decreases. These results are consistent with the demand for a Big 4 auditor being greater in higher agency cost
settings. They do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of a relation between hiring a Big 4 auditor and the fraction of
shares owned by the CEO for the main tests but they do in sensitivity tests.
The authors ﬁnd no association between the choice to hire a Big 4 auditor and CEO family-related agency
variables. Speciﬁcally, there is no signiﬁcant evidence that the demand for a Big 4 auditor is aﬀected when a
family relationship exists between the CEO and the major shareholder or as the number of board members
related to the CEO increases. While some CEOs in family-related agency settings may wish to signal more
credible reporting by hiring a Big 4 auditor, other CEOs in these settings may feel a Big 4 auditor is either
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could be reduced by a Big 4 audit.
3.2. Institutional ownership
Institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual funds are often “large” shareholders. In addition,
they are typically viewed as “sophisticated investors” in the literature. The extant theoretical literature gener-
ally predicts large institutional investors as an eﬃcient form of corporate governance. However, large institu-
tional holders are not using their own money to make investments. Thus, with regulatory constraints or lack
of incentives, Coﬀee (1991) argues that institutional shareholders tend to be passive.
Prior research has documented that sophisticated investors behave diﬀerently from other, less informed
investors (e.g., Callen et al., 2005). Sophisticated investors have superior abilities and consequently can learn
better from experience (Bonner and Walker, 1994). Economic incentives are potentially important as well.
Institutional investors have large investment portfolios and, therefore, have much more to gain or lose in
absolute dollar terms from their investment decisions. Furthermore, the costs of engaging in in-depth
ﬁrm analysis are lower for institutions, in part because of their superior access to databases and analytical
tools.
Research documents the existence of distinct groups among institutions that diﬀer in their objectives and
information needs. Bushee (1998) classiﬁes institutions into three groups – transient, dedicated, and quasi-
indexers. “Transient” institutions have high portfolio turnover and highly diversiﬁed portfolio holdings. They
focus on the short term and make investments based on the likelihood of short-term trading proﬁts. According
to Bushee (2001), the short investment horizons of transient investors create little incentive for them to gather
information relevant to long-run value.
In contrast, “dedicated” investors and “quasi-indexers” focus on the long term and provide stable owner-
ship to ﬁrms. Dedicated investors hold large stakes in a limited number of ﬁrms. Such ownership creates
greater incentives to invest in monitoring management and to rely on information beyond current earnings
to assess managers’ performance. Quasi-indexers generally follow indexing and buy-and-hold strategies,
and are characterized by high diversiﬁcation. Although quasi-indexers follow a passive investment strategy,
these investors may also have strong incentives to monitor management to ensure that it is acting in the best
interest of the ﬁrm.
Many studies report results that are consistent with a superior ability of sophisticated investors to gather,
analyze, and price information. Price (1998) ﬁnds that informed investors appear to make greater use of
accounting disclosures and non-earnings information to form more precise earnings expectations. Bonner
et al. (2003) document that sophisticated investors incorporate the information inherent in the relative accu-
racy of analyst forecasts to a greater extent than less informed investors. In addition, Bhattacharya et al.
(2007) provide evidence that sophisticated investors demonstrate less behavioral bias in the way they process
pro forma earnings information relative to more sophisticated investors. Finally, the eﬃciency of a ﬁrm’s
stock price is associated with the degree of sophistication of the ﬁrm’s marginal investor (e.g., Bartov
et al., 2000).
As an example of my own work that includes institutional investors, Chen et al. (2012) shows that the dif-
ference between closed-end country funds’ net asset values and their trading prices (i.e., the fund discount) is
positively associated with the earnings opacity of the underlying companies. In conditional analyses they fur-
ther ﬁnd that the positive relation between earnings opacity and fund discounts is weaker for those funds with
a higher level of institutional ownership. In other words, investors who are better equipped at information
acquisition than other investors are able to overcome some of the information disadvantage of being “non-
local.” In an earlier study, Callen et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the variance contribution of foreign earnings increases
with the level of investment by long-term (but not short-term) institutional investors.
To sum, there is strong evidence that institutional investors are an important class of large shareholders, in
part because of their greater expertise in analyzing accounting information. There is also extensive evidence
that there is important variation among the diﬀerent classes of institutional investors. Thus, yet again we con-
clude that there is signiﬁcant diversity among even subgroups of large shareholders.
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3.3.1. History/background
State ownership of enterprises is far from new and is not solely conﬁned to Continental Europe or Asia. In
practice most states have relied on the state to kick start growth or at least to protect fragile industries. More
recently, Singapore is often viewed as starting the new kind of state capitalism. Lee Kuan Yew, its founding
father, was a tireless advocate of “Asian values,” by which he meant a mixture of family values and state con-
trol. However, state ownership is far from conﬁned to quasi-authoritative states. In particular, many govern-
ments have found it desirable to have a tight control over their natural resources such as oil and gas. In China
Deng Xiaoping transformed the economy by embracing globalization through creating special economic zones
and inviting foreign companies in. He forced state enterprises to model themselves on Western companies and
concentrated resources on national champions.8
3.3.2. Scale and importance of state ownership
State ownership is prevalent around the world. The rich world still has a large number of state-owned or
state-dominated companies. For example, France owns 85% of EDF, Japan owns 50% of Japan Tobacco,
and Germany owns 32% of Deutsche Telekom. In total OECD state-owned enterprises have a combined
value of almost $2 trillion and employ 6 m people. However, state-owned enterprises are even more impor-
tant in the emerging world. They make up most of the market capitalization of China’s and Russia’s stock
markets and account for 28 of the emerging world’s 100 biggest companies. Finally, in terms of industry
focus, state ownership is especially noticeable in the energy sector, with the 13 biggest oil ﬁrms in the
world all being state-backed (as is the world’s biggest natural-gas company, Russia’s Gazprom).9 These
are also the companies in which governments tend to have the highest ownership stakes and the most direct
control.
3.3.3. Types of state ownership and quality of management
Property rights theory argues that ownership and control rights should be given to the parties that make ex-
ante speciﬁc investments (e.g., Hart and Moore, 1996). According to the property rights theory SOE managers
lack incentives to maximize corporate proﬁtability, as the majority of the ﬁrm is owned by the state. Building
on property rights theory, Hart et al. (1997) argue that privatized ﬁrms have a better incentive to minimize
costs, but the systematic pursuit of proﬁts may lead to poorer service quality. For example, following the priv-
atization of railways in the UK and the Netherlands the quality of service visibly deteriorated. Schmidt (1996)
argues that a trade-oﬀ exists for state-ownership. The beneﬁt is that under state ownership the government has
better information about the ﬁrm’s management. The cost is that the government tends to interfere too much
for political reasons.
In practice not all SOEs are created equal and there is evidence that governments are becoming more
sophisticated owners. Only a handful of SOEs are still reporting directly to government ministries.10 In con-
trast most governments prefer to exercise control through their ownership of shares. Sometimes they hold all
the shares, but increasingly they prefer to dilute their shareholdings.11 There is also evidence that SOEs have
become more productive as a result of restructuring. For example, in China their return on assets increased
from 0.7% in 1998 to 6.3% in 2006 (although accounting ﬁgures obviously can be manipulated – which should
provide a promising area for future research). I discuss more China-related issues in Section 5.2.7 The primary source for this subsection is The Economist Special Report “The Visible Hand” January 31, 2012.
8 Similarly, the post-Soviet disaster created a craving for order and the Russian government reasserted direct state control over
“strategic” industries.
9 However, state ﬁrms can be found in almost any industry. China Mobile has 600 million customers. Saudi Basic Industries
Corporation is a huge chemical company. Russia’s Sberbank is Europe’s third-largest bank. Dubai Ports is the world’s third-largest ports
operator. In addition to having ownership stakes in companies, governments are also important large owners through sovereign wealth
funds.
10 Statoil of Norway is the world’s 13th-biggest oil company by revenue. Norway also has the third-biggest sovereign-wealth fund, the
Government Pension Fund. Both are required to behave like regular companies.
11 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development deﬁnes a state-owned company as one in which the state owns more than
10% of the shares.
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Compared with the other groups discussed in this section, employees are typically less signiﬁcant as owners.
However, there is also signiﬁcantly less research on employee ownership and there are interesting cross-coun-
try variations in how ﬁrms are structured and hence in the importance of employees in the governance of the
ﬁrms, both of which create opportunities for future studies. Although clearly a generalization, it is probably
fair to state that employees, including labor unions, have a relatively stronger say in Continental Europe than
elsewhere.
The pros and cons of employee ownership have inspired much debate in recent years (Bova et al., 2012). On
the one hand, advocates of employee ownership cite evidence which suggests that employee ownership leads to
increasing employee–manager goal alignment and productivity gains that are ultimately reﬂected in higher
shareholder returns (Kruse, Blasi, and Park, 2009). On the other hand, contrasting empirical evidence suggests
that giving non-manager employees too much ownership in the company can erode shareholder value (La
Porta et al., 1997).12
What is perhaps especially interesting about employees as an owner group is that there are three very dif-
ferent groups: managers, non-manager employees, and unions. There has been a fair amount of research on
managerial ownership but much less on other employees and unions. Focusing on top managers’ stock-based
incentives, Nagar et al. (2003) ﬁnd that stock-based incentives (and thus ownership) can reduce agency prob-
lems between managers and shareholders, and thus increase the incentives for managers to disclose
information.
In contrast, Bova et al. (2012) investigate the role of non-manager employee ownership on voluntary dis-
closure. Speciﬁcally, they focus on the ﬁrm’s employees as a group of stakeholders that have the potential to
extract above-market rents from the ﬁrm and on employee ownership as a tool to mitigate this potential to
extract rents. This provides for an interesting contrast between these two roles (“alignment” versus “rent
extraction). The literature provides evidence that managers have an incentive to keep information asymmetric
with the market if employees can extract above-market rents from the ﬁrm – for example, in cases where the
employee base is highly unionized. The beneﬁt to the strategy of disclosing less is that reduced transparency
should weaken the employees’ bargaining position. However, an opaque disclosure policy keeps information
asymmetric with not only employees, but also investors and other stakeholders. Employee ownership can thus
potentially play an important role in mitigating this tension. Cramton et al. (2008) provides analytical and
empirical evidence that employee stock ownership leads to a greater propensity for employees to internalize
the costs of labor disputes, which in turn reduces employees’ incentive to extract rents through costly strikes,
which are deadweight losses. The decrease in the incentive arises as employee compensation becomes more
closely linked to the stock returns of the ﬁrm, leading to any costly negotiation frictions (e.g., extended nego-
tiations or strikes) impacting employee compensation to a greater extent.
Bova et al. (2012) employ a number of proxies for voluntary disclosure and ﬁnd that ﬁrms whose non-man-
ager employees have strong bargaining power provide less voluntary disclosure whereas ﬁrms whose employ-
ees have larger equity stakes in the ﬁrm provide greater voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, the eﬀect of
employee ownership in generating better disclosure is particularly strong, the greater employees’ negotiation
leverage. In other words, employee ownership appears to beneﬁt the ﬁrm by not only aligning goals between
the ﬁrm and its employees, but by also increasing disclosure from the ﬁrm to all of its stakeholders by miti-
gating the ﬁrm’s need to keep information opaque.
In conclusion, there is limited research on employee ownership and great potential for future research to
take advantage of cross-country variation in such ownership.12 For example, in 1995, United Airlines awarded employees 55% of the ﬁrm’s equity in exchange for concessions on salaries and beneﬁts.
While the plan at the time was applauded by the US Federal government as an innovative way to heal the fractious nature of the union–
management relationship, others remained skeptical of allowing a stakeholder that already contracted with the ﬁrm enough power to
essentially control the ﬁrm’s decision making (Bova et al., 2012).
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4.1. Importance of private ﬁrms
Private ﬁrms provide an important vehicle for economic growth around the world. More than 99% of lim-
ited liability companies, in most countries, are not listed on a stock exchange (e.g., Pacter, 2004; Chen et al.,
2011). In the aggregate, non-listed ﬁrms have about four times more employees, three times higher revenues,
and twice the amount of assets than do listed ﬁrms (Berzins et al., 2008). In 2008, Forbes reported that the 441
largest private companies in the United States accounted for $1.8 trillion in revenues and employed 6.2 million
people. Furthermore, according to the US Census Bureau, there are 29 million privately held companies in the
United States, 7.6 million of which have paid employees, representing one-half of the nation’s GDP (Hope
et al., 2012b). Despite their obvious importance to the economy, there is limited extant research on private
ﬁrms in general and in particular very little research related to accounting and auditing of such ﬁrms.4.2. How are private ﬁrms diﬀerent?
Private ﬁrms are diﬀerent from publicly traded ﬁrms in several respects. Private ﬁrms are more closely held,
have diﬀerent governance, and have greater managerial ownership. Moreover, their major capital providers
often have insider access to corporate information and typically take a more active role in management. With
greater ownership concentration than in public corporations, large shareholders have a greater potential to
take advantage of their controlling positions and direct private beneﬁts for personal consumption, which is
the typical problem of expropriation of minority shareholders and creditors (e.g., Morck et al., 1988).4.3. The role of accounting and auditing in private ﬁrms
Some researchers take a strong position on whether accounting and auditing plays a lesser or stronger role
in private compared with public ﬁrms. Personally I have no strong priors and I frankly believe there is not
much evidence comparing the relative usefulness of accounting in these two sets of ﬁrms. In addition, I am
not certain that it is fruitful to pursue such a line of inquiry per se.
The arguments in favor of reduced importance of accounting in private ﬁrms include the following. Most
importantly, researchers often argue that there is lower demand for public accounting information in private
ﬁrms as stakeholders may have access to private information. Furthermore, given the stronger ownership con-
centration, shareholder turnover is lower, and shareholders take a more active role in management, which
some claim would reduce their reliance on ﬁnancial statements for monitoring managers compared with public
ﬁrms.
However, there are competing arguments also. Private ﬁrms typically have a weaker overall information
environment compared with the relatively stronger disclosure environment of public ﬁrms. This suggests that,
even if say the ﬁnancial reporting quality (FRQ) is lower for private ﬁrms, accounting information could still
play an important role since there are fewer competing sources of information.13 For example, McNichols and
Stubben (2008) emphasize the role that accounting information plays in internal decision making. Small ﬁrms
are unlikely to have management accounting systems that are separate from ﬁnancial accounting, potentially
enhancing the role of accounting in internal decision making (Chen et al., 2011). Finally, it is possible that the
lack of analyst coverage and lower media coverage makes accounting information a relatively greater compo-
nent of the overall information set used for decision making by insiders or outsiders (Chen et al., 2011).
With respect to the role of auditing, it is not obvious whether external auditors play a lesser or a stronger
role in private ﬁrms than in public ﬁrms (Hope and Langli, 2010; Hope et al., 2011, 2012). On the one hand,
Coﬀee (2005) discusses how the existence of controlling (i.e., especially large) shareholders can aﬀect auditor
independence. That is, Coﬀee (2005) argues that it is diﬃcult for the auditor to escape the control of the party
that she is expected to monitor. On the other hand, it is possible that the monitoring value of auditing is higher
13 For example, Indjejikian and Matejka (2009) highlight the importance of accounting information for private ﬁrms in compensation
contracts.
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accounting and non-accounting information than public ﬁrms (e.g., Lennox, 2005).
4.4. Some ﬁndings from the private ﬁrm setting14
Not surprisingly, accounting research has focused primarily on properties of earnings and in particular on
comparing ﬁnancial reporting quality between private and public ﬁrms. There is clearly some tension in this
question – whereas the “demand” perspective predicts higher FRQ for public ﬁrms, the “opportunism” per-
spective lead to the opposite prediction. While some research that has focused on specialized samples and
industries have found higher FRQ in private ﬁrms, the large-sample investigations to date suggest that the
demand hypothesis dominates and that FRQ is higher on average in public ﬁrms (e.g., Burgstahler et al.,
2006 for European ﬁrms; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005 for UK ﬁrms; Hope et al., 2012b for US ﬁrms).
4.4.1. Hope et al. (2012b)
There is very limited research to date on within-private ﬁrm variation in accounting. Hope et al. (2012b)
provide the ﬁrst exploration of cross-sectional variations in the FRQ of US private ﬁrms. They show that pri-
vate ﬁrms with greater external ﬁnancing needs and a greater presence of long-term debt have higher FRQ and
greater conservatism.
More directly related to the topic of large shareholders, Hope et al. (2012) also investigate the expected
impact of organizational form on FRQ from two perspectives – owner–manager separation and ownership
dispersion. Because managers understand that their actions are not perfectly observable by the owner, man-
agers have the ability to hide unfavorable performance by manipulating reported performance. Thus, ﬁrms
which are more likely to suﬀer from agency costs (i.e., owner–manager separation) would be expected to have
lower FRQ.
Owners are expected to take action by monitoring the activities of the manager. However, monitoring is
costly, and owners are willing to incur monitoring costs only to the extent that the beneﬁts outweigh the costs.
These arguments suggest that when ownership dispersion is high, managers’ activities are less likely to be clo-
sely monitored and therefore manipulation of reported performance is more likely to occur. Based on these
arguments, ﬁrms with owner–manager separation and higher ownership dispersion should have lower FRQ.
However, Hope et al. (2012) also discuss competing arguments which suggest that separated ownership may
positively aﬀect private ﬁrms’ FRQ. A controlling shareholder may have the ability to extract resources from
the ﬁrm for personal consumption. These controlling shareholders may attempt to hide these activities from
other stakeholders by manipulating reported performance. Such activities would lead to a positive relation
between owner–manager separation and FRQ. In addition, the demand perspective would also predict a posi-
tive relation. In particular, when agency costs are higher, those contracting with the ﬁrm may demand more
reliable ﬁnancial information.
Hope et al.’s empirical ﬁndings indicate that private ﬁrms with more dispersed ownership (i.e., C corpora-
tions) have lower FRQ than other organizational structures as measured by three widely used FRQ proxies.
These results are in line with the agency cost arguments (but not the demand arguments) described above.15
4.4.2. Hope et al. (2011)
Hope et al. (2011) use a sample of private ﬁrms from 68 countries (mostly from emerging markets) obtained
from the World Bank. They ﬁrst show that ﬁrms with greater ﬁnancial reporting credibility, operationalized as
ﬁnancial statements reviewed by an external auditor, experience signiﬁcantly lower perceived problems in
gaining access to external ﬁnance. More relevant to our topic, they additionally examine how this relation var-
ies with ownership concentration and with cross-country institutional factors.14 Recall that the ﬁndings of Hope et al. (2011) are summarized in Section 3.1.
15 They further ﬁnd that C corporations exhibit higher conditional conservatism, which might be explained by the higher information
asymmetry associated with C corporations creating the demand by investors, creditors, and others for more timely loss recognition. An
alternative explanation for this ﬁnding relates to tax eﬀects.
14 O.-K. Hope / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 3–20In their sample of private ﬁrms, the largest shareholder owns on average 74% of the shares and 69% of the
ﬁrms have a controlling owner. Thus, their cross-country sample provides a rich setting for testing the eﬀect of
large shareholders.
Hope et al. (2011) are primarily interested in the eﬀect of ﬁnancial reporting credibility on ﬁnancing
constraints in the presence of a controlling owner. When there is a controlling shareholder, ﬁnancial
reporting credibility can play a greater role in reducing costs associated with agency and information
problems. In other words, ﬁnancial credibility matters more when there is a stronger need for it (i.e., high
agency cost setting such as a controlling shareholder). In addition, there is no reason to expect increased
ﬁnancial credibility to reduce the beneﬁts associated with a controlling owner. In fact, ﬁnancial credibility
may further improve monitoring and incentive alignment when a controlling owner exists. Therefore,
regardless of whether the agency costs of a controlling owner outweigh the beneﬁts, the authors unambig-
uously predict that ﬁnancial credibility will have a greater eﬀect on reducing ﬁnancing constraints when a
controlling owner exists. Their empirical results support this hypothesis – the eﬀect of ﬁnancial credibility
on reducing perceived ﬁnancing constraints is increasingly important in the presence of a controlling
shareholder.
The study further examines the eﬀect of cross-country variations in institutional factors. Recent cross-
country literature places considerable emphasis on the adverse eﬀects of private beneﬁts of control (e.g.,
Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Countries which have better institutional properties (e.g., investor protection,
legal enforcement, creditor rights, etc.) are better equipped to curb costs associated with private beneﬁts
of control. Hence, if agency costs related to private beneﬁts of control are considered important by pro-
viders of external ﬁnance, then the mitigating role of ﬁnancial credibility would likely be more pronounced
in regimes with weaker institutions. In other words, ﬁnancial credibility matters more when agency prob-
lems are more severe. Because private beneﬁts of a controlling shareholder are less severe in countries with
stronger institutions, there is less concern for these agency costs, and ﬁnancial credibility is expected to
have less of an eﬀect. Consistent with these ideas, Hope et al. (2011) ﬁnd that the impact of ﬁnancial cred-
ibility in reducing ﬁnancing constraints in the presence of a controlling owner is more pronounced in
countries with weaker creditor rights.16
My conclusion from the limited extant research on private ﬁrms is that there is a wealth of opportunities for
future research. For example, there are interesting data sources available for private ﬁrms in China, and such
data bases could potentially be combined with data on political connections or other interesting issues relevant
for the Chinese setting.5. Country variations in the roles of large shareholders
5.1. Introduction
Although it is primarily the more general agency cost arguments from Jensen and Meckling (1976) that
have been cited by subsequent literature, it is also highly relevant for our discussion that Jensen and Mec-
kling discuss the important role which the legal system and the law play in social organizations, especially,
the organization of economic activity. In other words, we should not necessarily expect the same organi-
zational structures or the same economic outcomes across diﬀerent environments. As Jensen and Meckling
(1976) explain, statutory laws sets bounds on the kinds of contracts into which individuals and organiza-
tions may enter without risking criminal prosecution. They focus on how the police and related powers of
the state are used to enforce performance of contracts or to enforce the collection of damages for non-
performance. The courts adjudicate conﬂicts between contracting parties and establish precedents. Such
government activities aﬀect both the kinds of contracts executed and the extent to which contracting is
relied upon.
For a recent example of accounting research on how cross-country variations in the extent to which con-
tracts are enforced matter to accounting outcomes, Dou et al. (2013) predict (based on incomplete contracting16 Creditor rights are presumably one of the most important measures of legal protection associated with private ﬁrms.
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industries with a greater need for relationship-speciﬁc investments tend to smooth reported earnings more.17,18
Perhaps even more interesting than how certain institutional factors vary across countries is what I will call
“country peculiarities.” These are diﬀerences across countries that are due to a multitude of factors that are
diﬃcult to summarize for researchers. Hence it may make sense to separately analyze certain issues related to
large shareholders in speciﬁc countries. In the following I brieﬂy mention some examples from China, India,
and Japan/Korea.5.2. China: the role of state-owned enterprises
In China, the government plays a central role in corporate governance. In fact, the most obvious diﬀerence
between China and many other countries is likely in the extent of state ownership of large companies. Accord-
ing to Li and Zhang (2010), China has by far the highest percentage of state-controlled ﬁrms in the countries
they survey. Speciﬁcally, in their study the state is the “ultimate controller” for 63.15% of Chinese ﬁrms. In
contrast, the corresponding ﬁgures for their other sample countries are: Singapore 23.5%, Germany 6.3%,
France 5.11%, Hong Kong (included as a separate country in their study) 1.40%, Japan 0.80%, and the United
Kingdom 0.08%. This huge diﬀerence in reliance on state ownership in China versus other countries suggests
that the notion of large shareholders is likely quite diﬀerent in China.
There are two types of state-owned listed companies in China: either the company is controlled by a parent
(holding) company or the majority shares of the listed company are held by a state asset management (oper-
ational) company (Tomasic and Andrews, 2007). Tian (2001) ﬁnds that the government is the majority share-
holder of 31.4% of the Chinese public listed companies. Thus, the state is often the largest shareholder for
publicly traded companies resulting in many state-owned enterprises in the market. However, contradicting
theoretical and empirical evidence exist on whether the state ownership is beneﬁcial in creating market value.
Property rights theory argues that ownership and control rights should be given to the parties that make ex-
ante speciﬁc investments (e.g., Hart and Moore, 1996). According to the property rights theory SOE managers
lack incentives to maximize corporate proﬁtability, as the majority of the ﬁrm is owned by the state. However,
given the unique government structure in China, it is diﬃcult to draw any solid predictions through just exam-
ining the theoretical literature.
Oﬃcial statistics suggest that about one third of Chinese SOEs are loss makers, another third either break
even or making losses and the remaining one third are marginally proﬁtable (Bai, Liu, Lu, Song, and Zhang,
2003). Bai, Liu, Lu, Song, and Zhang (2003) empirically show that a ﬁrm’s performance is negatively aﬀected
when the largest shareholder is the government. Tomasic and Andrews (2007) conducted interviews with var-
ious corporate participants and outline how there is a lack of minority shareholder protection in the presence
of state ownership in China.
However, state ownership can also be beneﬁciary. For example, state ownership can provide long-term and
stable ownership and ensure ﬁnancing is available also during crisis periods. Both Tian (2001) and Hess et al.
(2010) conclude that there is a U-shaped relation between government shareholding and market value. The
detected U-shape implies that ﬁrms dominated by the state players continue to maintain a greater respect
by the market and outperform those with lower levels of state ownership. However, the eﬀects of state own-
ership in mitigating minority shareholder expropriation or manipulation of the market at lower levels of state
ownership are limited.
Whether state ownership is “good or bad” is not as relevant to accounting researchers as how it can aﬀect
interesting outcomes. In the following I very brieﬂy review some recent studies that focus on ownership issues
(and state ownership in particular) in China.
You and Du (2012) employ both agency and resource dependency theory to predict involuntary CEO dis-
missal and subsequent ﬁrm performance in Chinese ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that board monitoring mechanisms
17 Dou et al. (2012) further decompose income smoothing into “garbled” and “informational” components and ﬁnd that results are
driven by the informational component of income smoothing.
18 Although not the focus of this article, I would recommend authors to look beyond the standard La Porta et al. measures when looking
for country-level variations. This is not a criticism of the La Porta et al. measures; however there are many other interesting variables and
new websites available.
16 O.-K. Hope / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 3–20explain very little of the outcomes, but political ties with government oﬃcials at the state, provincial, county,
and city levels are highly predictive of CEO turnover and ultimately ﬁrm performance. In other words, they
conclude that political ties overrule economic norms in China, lending stronger support for the resource
dependency perspective and challenging the agency cost perspective in the Chinese context.
Li and Zhang (2010) use Shanghai National Accounting Institute’s Chinese Firms’ social responsibility
ranking and observe a negative relation between corporate ownership dispersion and corporate social respon-
sibility for a state-owned ﬁrm; whereas a positive relation exists for non-state-owned ﬁrms. The authors attri-
bute their ﬁnding to the large degree of political interference in state-owned ﬁrms.19
Pi and Lowe (2011) ﬁnd no association between Chinese CEO turnover and the percentage of shares held
by CEOs. They interpret the ﬁnding to mean that CEOs do not derive signiﬁcant power from their shareholder
status in China. Furthermore, they ﬁnd that CEOs in state-owned ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly less likely to be
replaced involuntarily and conclude that CEOs in state-owned ﬁrms are likely enjoying more discretion
because state-owned ﬁrms have weaker corporate governance mechanisms and strong political connections.20
5.3. India: the role of business groups
Transaction cost theory suggests that the optimal structure of a ﬁrm depends on its institutional context.
Khanna and Palepu (2000) discuss how diversiﬁed business groups dominate private sector activity in many
emerging markets and in particular in India.21 The typical Indian business groups are collections of publicly
traded ﬁrms in a wide variety of industries, with a signiﬁcant amount of common ownership and control, usu-
ally by a family. Prior US literature has documented that businesses aﬃliated with diversiﬁed ﬁrms underper-
form their focused competitors. Among the reasons cited for the underperformance of diversiﬁed corporations
are inappropriate allocation of decision rights, ineﬃcient allocation of capital, and poor internal governance.
In countries such as India there are a variety of market failures, caused by information and agency prob-
lems. For example, ﬁrms often provide limited ﬁnancial disclosure and often have weak corporate governance
and control. In addition, intermediaries such as ﬁnancial analysts or the ﬁnancial press are not fully evolved
and securities regulations and related enforcement are weaker than in Western countries. There is thus a
potential for diversiﬁed business groups that can act as an intermediary between individual entrepreneurs
and imperfect markets.
Khanna and Palepu (2000) analyze the performance of aﬃliates of diversiﬁed Indian business groups rel-
ative to unaﬃliated ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that accounting and stock market measures of ﬁrm performance initially
decline with group diversiﬁcation and subsequently increase once group diversiﬁcation exceeds a certain level.
Interestingly, unlike US conglomerates’ lines of business, aﬃliates of the most diversiﬁed business groups out-
perform unaﬃliated ﬁrms. Of the potential sources of performance eﬀects of group aﬃliation, Khanna and
Palepu (2000) ﬁnd the strongest eﬀect related to group-aﬃliated ﬁrms’ access to international capital markets
(presumably due to the track record of the group as a whole).22
5.4. Japan and Korea: the role of keiretsus and chaebols
The ownership structure of Japanese (and also many Korean) ﬁrms is typically highly concentrated among
corporate stockholders with ﬁnancial institutions occupying a majority of the stock holdings (e.g., Douthett
19 Bai et al. (2004) use a panel date of 32 two-digit industries in 29 Chinese regions over the period of 1985–1997 and ﬁnd that the degree
of regional specialization is low for ﬁrms with larger shares of state ownership. The ﬁnding indicates that local governments have strong
incentives to protect their industries.
20 Chang and Wong (2004) examine local party committees’ role in China’s economic reform and suggest publicly listed Chinese ﬁrms can
improve ﬁrm performance through decreasing local political party members’ existing control level, supporting the grabbing hand theory.
In addition, Yang et al. (2011) also support the idea of decreasing state-ownership in China to improve corporate governance. Huang and
Xu (2009) study large blocks of share transfer in China and ﬁnd a positive correlation between private beneﬁt of control and block price
but a negative relation between trading restrictions and block price. Moreover, private institutions oﬀer a higher price than state-owned
institutions.
21 Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) provide a theoretical analysis of family business groups and in particular provide a new rationale for
pyramidal ownership. A pyramid allows a family to access all retained earnings of a ﬁrm it already controls to set up a new ﬁrm, and to
share the new ﬁrm’s no diverted payoﬀ with share-holders of the original ﬁrm.
22 Rather surprisingly, there is very limited accounting research using Indian data, which suggests opportunities for future work.
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of enterprises – keiretsus – composed of ﬁrms in diﬀerent industries. These ﬁrms are interrelated through cross
holdings of equity ownership and generally rely on a large commercial bank for their primary banking needs.
The keiretsu ﬁrms maintain close ﬁnancial and personal ties through cross-shareholding, credit holding, inter-
locking corporate directorates within the group, and a variety of business transactions.
On the one hand, the keiretsu relationship has the potential to increase the monitoring of managerial per-
formance. On the other hand, the keiretsu relationship may decrease the eﬀectiveness of monitoring. Managers
may entrench in an ineﬃcient, low-eﬀort arrangement in which managers protect each other in the market for
corporate control, resulting in an anti-competitive and exclusionary environment.
As but one example from Japan, Douthett and Jung’s (2001) ﬁnd that Japanese keiretsu ﬁrms have higher
earnings response coeﬃcients (their proxy for informativeness of earnings) than those of non-keiretsu ﬁrms. In
addition, the ERC increases as the strength of the keiretsu relationship increases. Finally, discretionary accru-
als by keiretsu ﬁrms are smaller than discretionary accruals of non-keiretsu ﬁrms. Douthett and Jung (2001)
conclude that the monitoring ability of the keiretsu improves the informativeness of earnings.
Business practices in Korea are similar although not identical to Japan. There is widespread use of pyramid
ownership structures and cross-holdings among ﬁrms that belong to a business group. This type of corporate
structure allows controlling shareholders to exercise full control over a ﬁrm despite holding a relatively small
portion of its cash ﬂow rights (e.g., Baek et al., 2006). Such a divergence between ownership and control raises
concerns about the degree to which the controlling shareholders siphon resources out of ﬁrms to increase their
wealth, that is, the degree to which the controlling shareholders engage in tunneling.
Baek et al. (2006) ﬁnd that Korean chaebol issuers involved in intragroup deals set the private securities
oﬀering prices to beneﬁt their controlling shareholders. They also ﬁnd that chaebol issuers realize an 8.8%
higher announcement return than do other types of issuers if they sell private securities at a premium to other
member ﬁrms, and if the controlling shareholders receive positive net gains from equity ownership in issuers
and acquirers. These results are consistent with tunneling within business groups.23
The overall conclusion from this section is that standard agency cost theory predictions do not necessarily
apply to all countries around the world. The legal, cultural, and other contexts in which ownership operates
will likely inﬂuence the governance impact of large shareholders. It is incumbent upon us as researchers to
both understand the environment that we are studying and to make use of such variations in the environment
to come up with interesting new research questions to pursue. The good news is that there should be plenty of
opportunities for future research!
6. Brief concluding remarks
This article has focused on highlighting the heterogeneity of large shareholders. Speciﬁcally, I discuss the
importance of families, institutions, governments, and employees as shareholders. The roles of each of these
is likely diﬀerent and thus it is prudent to go beyond overly general notions of “large shareholders” and
instead consider exactly who the owners are, and also suggests that further research on speciﬁc shareholder
type eﬀects on accounting outcomes would be welcome. I also emphasize that if researchers are really inter-
ested in researching ownership concentration, private ﬁrms may be the most fertile ground, both because these
ﬁrms tend to have more concentrated ownership and because there is considerably less prior research on these
economically important ﬁrms compared with publicly traded companies.
But perhaps most importantly, I would encourage readers to use their imagination and not just “follow the
bandwagon” in terms of choosing research topics. I would recommend reading outside of accounting (both to
ﬁnd interesting topics and to bring methodological advances into accounting) and to follow closely what is
happening in practice. There are many exciting research opportunities in China and I very much look forward
to future issues of CJAR and to attending future conferences in China.23 Bae et al. (2008) examine intragroup propping within Korean chaebols. They ﬁnd that the announcement of increased (decreased)
earnings by a chaebol-aﬃliated ﬁrm has a positive (negative) eﬀect on the market value of other non-announcing aﬃliates. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the market’s ex ante valuation of intragroup.
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